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Institutional Change, Nineteenth-Century Growth, 
and the Early Modern Legacy
When the English statistician Gregory King drew up the ﬁrst comparative
statement of per capita income within England, France, and the Dutch Republic
at the end of the seventeenth century, the economic achievements and derived
political leverage of the United Provinces had already been distinctive for sev-
eral decades.1 Since the 1580s, their technical prowess, ﬁnancial strength, and
commercial preponderance had bafﬂed and worried foreign observers from
Thomas Mun to Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Productivity, per capita income, and
investment had experienced a structural increase—a process which, as King
acknowledged, had made Holland by far the most prosperous region within
Europe by the end of the seventeenth century.Rooted in a long history of agri-
cultural development related to early urbanization and in ecological changes
that made arable agriculture on increasingly marginal (peat) lands difﬁcult to
practice, farming in the provinces of the western and northern part of the coun-
try over the course of the ﬁfteenth, sixteenth, and early seventeenth centuries
became geared to speciﬁc parts of market demand, with an emphasis on rais-
ing livestock and dairy produce.Even more famously spectacular were changes
at the other end of the reallocation process, that is, in services. Substitution of
imported grain for homegrown cereals linked agrarian change to an original
expansion in commerce and shipping. Yet it was only with the exploitation of
the wider complementarity of especially Baltic and southern European supply
and demand patterns, and the organization of “rich trades” based on colonial
expansion, that Dutch overseas commerce evolved into the active entrepôt sys-
tem that would serve as the hub of world trade and ﬁnance for over a century
and a half. Based on a mixture of geographic advantage, shipbuilding innova-
tions, ﬁnancial instruments that lowered transaction costs, naval power, and an
unrivaled stock of low-cost merchant shipping, Dutch merchants were able to
extend their traditional dominance in Baltic bulk cargoes to include items such
as spices, sugar, and textiles, all requiring close links with a wide range of pro-
cessing industries.2 Backward linkages between naval transport and ancillary
industries, a human capital windfall from the skilled hands of immigrants ﬂee-
ing the Habsburg provinces, reliable access to imported inputs, and a spate of
technical change also helped foster the export-based growth of a labor-intensive
industrial sector.By applying improved methods of using wind and peat energy2 • Introduction
and by modifying processing technologies in sectors such as textiles, paper-
making, oil pressing, distilling, sawing, and ceramics, the productivity of labor
and competitiveness in manufacturing soared. As a consequence, foreign and
domestic labor was attracted to cities such as Leiden, Gouda, and Haarlem,
where specialized branches of industry grew up.
From a wider perspective, Dutch primacy in international trade revolution-
ized the économies mondes inherited from the late sixteenth century. It trans-
formed European colonial settlement in the Far East and the New World and
established patterns of trade based on comparative efﬁciency by reducing risk
and information asymmetry.3 At the domestic level, it linked Dutch regional
grain prices to the international market (thus dampening the variability of food
prices), fostered an unparalleled division of labor, and established the role of
formal factor and commodity markets.
The political and ﬁscal institutions underpinning these development character-
istics were affected only to a limited extent by the economic changes after
1580. Rooted in resistance against the executive centralization, ﬁscal reforms,
and religious strains of Habsburg rule, the Dutch Revolt that started in the
1570s served to consolidate “traditional” regional and urban privileges within
a loose confederate alliance, rather than transforming the structure of politics.
By limiting the leverage of central policy-making institutions and leaving sov-
ereign power in the hands of the provincial states, the Dutch polity functioned
on the basis of subsidiarity that acknowledged earlier prerogatives and the
need for negotiated compromise over common interests.Because its decentral-
ized structure was composed of a hierarchy of urban particularism and repre-
sentation at the provincial level, the mechanics of the Republic’s political
system were deﬁned only in part by its constitutional aspects. To a perhaps
larger extent, they were forged by a changeable equilibrium in the allotment of
powers, ruled over by the seemingly contradictory principles of provincial sov-
ereignty and that of the union between the provinces, which was dominated by
Holland.With the constitution of government specifying the sovereignty of the
seven provinces, the provincial states were, in turn, mostly dominated by
largely independent towns.But even in the more rural inland provinces, politi-
cal opinion in the states typically balanced out. Moreover, while delegations
of each of the “allies” held a single vote in the States General, and unanimity
was prescribed in decisions of federal importance, that—contrary to the provin-
cial states—it was in permanent session, dependent on the ﬁscal leverage of
Holland, and physically close to the meeting place of the states of Holland
and the quarters of its stadtholder, made monitoring costs over the inland del-
egates high, the distribution of power asymmetric, and the qualiﬁcation of
issues open to dispute.4 With the effectively depoliticized Council of State left
to preside over annual budget proposals and a reinterpreted position of what (ex-
cept for the two northern provinces) was typically a joint stadtholder wieldingInstitutional Change • 3
power over numerous local appointments and the armed forces, the Dutch early
modern system of executive rule functioned by an elaborate complex of largely
informal checks and balances. Yet in deﬁance of forces pushing toward cen-
tralization, notably debt accumulation that placed pressure on the existing ﬁscal
fragmentation and the recurrently changing political prominence of succes-
sive stadtholders, the Republic would continue to abide by this form of gov-
ernment for the duration of its existence. Indeed, as especially J. L. Price has
propounded, it was only through such a limited set of central institutions that
the context could be provided for formulating joint policy objectives while
at the same time balancing the economic and political dominance of Holland
against the political independence of the other sovereign provinces for more
than two centuries.5
In contrast to its “anachronistic exceptionality” in political structure, the
Habsburg Netherlands and the ensuing Dutch Republic, ﬁnally, are also held to
have pioneered a revolution in public ﬁnance. Fueled initially by the wartime
ﬁscal demands of Charles V, the regular imposition of province-wide excise
and property taxes, formally earmarked as service annuities transferable on the
open market, underwrote a smoothing of tax returns, the creation of long-term
public debt, and the emergence of a market in negotiable securities.6 After
1572 the rebellious provinces were increasingly able to command large sums
with a high risk proﬁle for relatively low rates of interest.The reverse implica-
tion was, of course, a comparatively unparalleled incidence of taxation and the
introduction of ﬁscal redistribution as a principal bone of distributive con-
tention between the various provinces.Given the commercial and ﬁnancial pre-
ponderance of Holland, this “capital-intensive path of state formation” (in the
terminology of Charles Tilly) provided an efﬁcient way of raising funds
beyond taxation by implying the strongest possible nonreneging commitment
to bondholders, but at the same time was rooted in the fact that the underlying
reform of public ﬁnance did not inaugurate the emergence of a nation-state.7
Despite being built upon a longer history of political and economic change, the
Dutch economic and political ascendancy of the late sixteenth and early seven-
teenth centuries was nevertheless swift, hegemonic, and threatening to vested
commercial interests. The Republic not only achieved dominance in trade,
transport, and ﬁnance but also acquired the international leverage to promote
and protect its adjoining policy objectives.But, at the time when its macroeco-
nomic performance was assessed as part of King’s exercise in political arith-
metic, a change in its advanced path of development occurred, and the
essential phenomenon of the period subsequent to King’s inquiries was to be
one of relative decline.While there has been largely unresolved debate over the
precise pace and chronology, it is widely agreed that between the last quarter of
the seventeenth century and the commercial disruptions of the Napoleonic era,
the economy of Holland—and, by force of numbers, that of the Republic—4 • Introduction
experienced a long-term standstill in productivity, a loss of international market
share in commodity trade, and a decline in manufacturing output.8 In parallel
fashion, by the end of the eighteenth century Holland’s international political
stature had been reduced to little more than that set down in John Adams’s
famous metaphor of a squeaking frog caught between the legs of the two bulls
engaged in the Anglo-French conﬂict.9Starting with the commercial disruption,
aggravated ﬁscal imbalance, and rekindled political turbulence engendered by
the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War of 1780–84, the years prior to the 1814–15 Treaty
of Vienna saw not only overseas blockades and international monetary poli-
cies distorting commodity and capital ﬂows but also Prussian and attempted
British and French military invasions, ﬁscal exigencies, and ﬁnally the default
of the state. Accordingly, it is a basic yet only rarely emphasized fact that the
history of the early modern Dutch state is delimited not only by the events
that occasioned its independence from Habsburg rule and, at the other end of
the spectrum, a subordination to Napoleonic policy objectives after 1795, but
simultaneously also by the rise and decline of its economic viability.
Such a conclusion is further enhanced by the evolution of scholarly exchange
in the debate on the chronology and sectoral aspects of nineteenth-century
industrialization.Few hypotheses in Dutch economic history have attracted as
much scholarly discussion as that about the nation’s late, or “retarded,” transi-
tion to industrialized modernity, reﬂected in a piecemeal process of mecha-
nization until the 1890s. From the ﬁrst works addressing the issue—most
famous is I. J. Brugmans’s 1925 dissertation—to the authoritative 1968 work
by De Jonge on industrial growth after 1850, the tendency is to associate this
apparent lack of industrial dynamism with macroeconomic stagnation.10 Yet in
more recent years the historiography of nineteenth-century development has
moved away from conﬂating a paucity of changes in mechanization and ﬁrm
size with a lack of income growth. Starting with a range of books and papers
by Grifﬁths, Bos, and De Meere published between 1979 and 1982, the notion
of backwardness became questioned, and the focus of debate on industrial per-
formance shifted from alleged entrepreneurial inertia and capital market fail-
ings to combined cost penalties resulting from transport and input costs related
to natural resource endowments and from high wage levels, the result of early
modern wage developments.11 Moreover, modest growth in sectoral output and
productivity was identiﬁed for the years after 1830. Instead of “backward” or
“late,” as Grifﬁths’s 1980 inaugural lecture termed the issue, the Dutch devel-
opment transition had been “different,” its sectoral pattern having been marked
by “balanced growth.”12 Finally, a recent succession of quantitative analyses of
economic performance during this period have posited a drawn-out transition
in the structure and causes of productivity change coming to full fruition after
1850. This new range of sectoral studies measuring changes in value added
and factor-input combinations have argued for a modiﬁed chronology and
broadened interpretational framework of Dutch economic development.13Institutional Change • 5
In consequence, evaluated from either side of the turbulent 1795 to 1813
revolutionary period and within the context of disjointed historiographical
debates, the present general consensus may be said to identify a chronological
concurrence between a transition in the structure of economic performance and
a realignment of executive government and ﬁscal accountability.Straddling the
political turbulence and commercial disruption triggered by the Fourth Anglo-
Dutch War and the institutional changes of the years after 1840, this phase saw
the mechanisms of Dutch politics altered in a way seemingly at odds with all
that had gone before, while simultaneously witnessing a transition in the struc-
ture of economic performance.A central message of this book is that this con-
currence was not just chronological.Rather, it was deterministic.Far from being
part of the separate realms of enlightened intellectualism and economic change
that have been featured in the literature so far, both processes—the reorganiza-
tion of the state and the observed pattern of economic development—were
strongly interrelated. We will argue that a speciﬁc constellation of political
power adapted from the early modern legacy and the post-Napoleonic settle-
ment, shortsighted ﬁscal policy, tax distortions, and institutionalized failings in
product markets together shaped the features of Dutch development in the early
nineteenth century.The 1840 political crisis over public ﬁnance that ushered in
debt conversion and constitutional reform was in the long run linked to another
restructuring of the process of growth. As a result, after 1860 we witness the
emergence of sectoral and distributive characteristics that ﬁtted the typol-
ogy formulated by Kuznets in the 1960s: that is, shifting sectoral output and
employment shares, urban labor absorption, increasing real wages, an enhanced
integration of markets through deregulation, and infrastructural change.14
These interrelationships were not limited to the phase between 1780 and 1848.
Liberal democracy and emerging industrialization (after 1860) caused the
emergence of new problems, such as the “social question,” which required
solution. This induced, after 1870, a series of developments into the direction
of a new institutional structure that would have a great effect on the state (i.e.,
the emergence of the welfare state in the course of the twentieth century) and
would shape the direction of economic change in the twentieth century.In this
complex way, we establish indirect links between the dramatic changes that
began after 1780, which demolished the old structure of the Republic, and the
new sociopolitical and economic structures that would arise in the Netherlands
in the twentieth century.
The theoretical basis for our assertion that reforms in the political sphere and
in the institutional framework of economic life in general affected the devel-
opment of the economy can be found in the extensive literature on institutional
economics in the broadest sense. In this context, institutions are deﬁned as the
rules, laws, and customs that facilitate transactions.These vary from unwritten6 • Introduction
customs on a speciﬁc market (e.g., is bargaining permitted? how is the sales
price determined?) to the laws of a country that regulate the property rights of
market participants. One of the concerns of institutional economists is where
these institutions come from and how speciﬁc institutions determine the struc-
ture of incentives that affect the behavior of the state, of entrepreneurs, and of
workers.For example, Douglass North, perhaps the most inﬂuential theoretician
in this area, deﬁnes the economic problem as the question of how cooperation
between individuals can come about: How do market transactions develop that
lead to division of labor and specialization? Which formal institutions—in the
sense of laws implemented by the state and enforced by a judicial apparatus—
and, at least as important, informal rules and customs guarantee the property
rights of agents? And how do these institutions, these rules of the game of the
market economy, change over time?15 It is clear that the state—the organization
that creates the statutory framework for market transactions—plays a funda-
mental role in this process of change.From this point of view, politics can be
interpreted as the game to continuously modify these rules. The rules of this
“meta-game” are, ultimately, determined by the constitution of the state. This
document establishes the formal rules that determine how political relationships
are deﬁned and how changes can be made in these relationships.
Economics and politics, the economy and the state, are from this point of view
closely linked to each other.The development of an economy is ultimately self-
determined by the constitution of a country, which, after all, deﬁnes how the
political game will be played.For example, it deﬁnes how the monarch and the
parliament can affect the outcome of the political process and, consequently,
how changes in institutions can come about.16 Our book will investigate how
close these relationships were. One central theme is the inﬂuence of the vari-
ous constitutions of the Netherlands on economic development.This concerns
the following stages of constitutional development:
• the decentralized state structure of the Republic, based on the Treaty of
Utrecht of 1579;
• the establishment of a uniﬁed state in 1798;
• the formation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands between 1813 and 1815;
• the breakthrough of liberal democracy in 1840–48;
• fundamental reforms aimed at the extension of the franchise of 1887 and
1917
We will attempt to show that these sequential constitutions had a major inﬂu-
ence on economic development during these periods in order to test and reﬁne
part of the program of the institutional economics. Moreover, this approach
links up with another closely related school of economic thought: political
economy. Economists from the generation of Tinbergen and Kuznets viewed
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“the formulator of rules under which economic activity was to be carried out;
as a referee . . . and as provider of infrastructure.”17 The essence of the new
political economy (public choice) that has unraveled such myths is that the
behavior of political actors is analyzed in an identical fashion to that of the
participants in markets, assuming that they strive for the maximization of a
speciﬁc public utility function, for power, prestige, budgets, or votes. During
this process, they are also confronted with constraints, with scarcity.In the view
of economists such as Downs, political entrepreneurs strive to be elected or
reelected; to achieve this aim, they attempt to accommodate the preferences of
the average voter (and in this way acquire the support of 50 percent of the elec-
torate plus one). A change in the voting system, such as an extension of the
franchise, can therefore have major consequences for the behavior of political
entrepreneurs and, consequently, for the result of the political process. As a
larger part of the population gains the right to vote, politicians who promote
the interests of less prosperous population groups can count on greater sup-
port.18 This mechanism will turn out to be very important for understanding
political dynamics after 1870.
The state can be seen as the ﬁrst layer of the institutional framework of an
economy. The second institutional layer is the arena of collective action, of
groups that have organized themselves with the aim of promoting their speciﬁc
interests.In their rent-seeking they often require the support of the state; exert-
ing inﬂuence on the political process is therefore one of the most important
aims of these interest groups.In a stable society, Olson (in his classic work on
political economy) expected a continuing increase in the number of interest
groups that were able to organize themselves. This ultimately results in a
process of institutional sclerosis, where the economic surplus will no longer be
invested in growth and development but is completely consumed by the dis-
tributive coalitions that control the state apparatus.19 This thought plays a role
in our analysis of the decentralized state structure of the Republic, which is
rooted in a relatively closely knit corporatist structure in which many interest
groups had entered coalitions with the urban oligarchy (or parts thereof). The
destruction of this corporatist society was one of the most important goals of
the Batavian revolutionaries.Under the slogan “Freedom, Equality, and Broth-
erhood,” they attempted to eliminate these corporatist structures; the abolish-
ment of the guilds is an example of this process.As we will see, these reforms
were only partly successful. The liberal reformers after 1840 still had to com-
plete the process.The acceleration of economic development that began in the
second half of the nineteenth century is, in our view, related to the liberaliza-
tion of economic life that began after 1798 and was ﬁnally completed in the
1840s and 1850s. However, it is striking that this process was barely com-
pleted when the construction of new corporatist institutions—trade unions,
farmers’ organizations, employers’ organizations—began.A phase of sponta-
neous, bottom-up, institutional renewal, which began after 1870, formed the8 • Introduction
basis for the corporatist structures that would characterize economic develop-
ment in the twentieth century.While in the eighteenth century institutional scle-
rosis and economic inertia went hand in hand—which is in accordance with
Olson’s expectations—the growing corporatism of the ﬁrst quarter of the twen-
tieth century was in fact linked to an acceleration in economic growth, which
does not agree with Olson’s predictions.20 Also at odds with his model is the
fact that the emergence of new interest groups did not appear to be a continu-
ous process—inherent to a stable society—but was concentrated in a relatively
brief period (between 1890 and 1920).This, too, requires an explanation.
The third layer of analysis in the present book concerns the issue of how eco-
nomic change was steered by these institutional changes and how it was in turn
the cause of new institutional experiments. This analysis concentrates on the
transition from a “stationary state” (characteristic of the eighteenth century) to
the process of “modern economic growth” (beginning in the 1860s and 1870s).
The ﬁrst term, which refers to a stationary economy, was coined by the founder
of economics, Adam Smith, who in his famous Wealth of Nations (1776) typ-
iﬁed the economic development of Holland in this way.This raises the question
of how it was possible for this relatively modern market economy to achieve a
virtually constant level of production and income during a period of approxi-
mately 150 years (between 1670 and 1820). Why was there no growth, based
on technological and organizational progress, during this extended period? The
second term, “modern economic growth,” originates from the founder of long-
term economic growth analysis, Simon Kuznets.21 He showed how long-term
growth in per capita income, the most important characteristic of modern eco-
nomic growth, is closely related to processes of structural transformation of
the economy, especially those characterized by the relative decline of agricul-
ture and the expansion of industry and the services sector.These changes were
also linked to the process of urbanization. The economic development after
1860 will be analyzed within this framework.
Focusing on these two concepts—a stationary state until 1820 and modern
economic growth after 1860—introduces a risk of disregarding the intervening
period. It is therefore important to pay a great deal of attention to explaining
the deviating development of the Netherlands during the ﬁrst half of the nine-
teenth century. The explanation, as one could expect on the basis of the pre-
ceding, can primarily be sought in the speciﬁc institutional development of the
Netherlands during this period.
Although this book concentrates on the endogenous forces that gave shape to
the processes of economic and institutional change, we certainly cannot ignore
the external inﬂuences that affected this small country. The decline of the
Republic after 1780 was initially the result of the dramatic end to the naval war
with the British (1780–84), the Prussian intervention (1787), and the French
occupation (1794–95).In other words, it was the result of the incapacity of theInstitutional Change • 9
Republic to sustain itself within the European state system, which, as Tilly has
pointed out, was characterized by warfare and preparation for war.22 This rela-
tive decline undermined the legitimacy of its form of government and led to
attempts to implement drastic reforms, ﬁrst by the Patriots and later by the
Batavian revolutionaries.Between 1814 and 1815, the major European powers
intervened in another way by expanding the state to include the southern
provinces of the Low Countries. The relatively independent position that the
Republic was still able to occupy as a “great power” was lost after 1815, and
the kingdom realized at important moments that it was especially dependent on
its “most natural ally,” Great Britain (which, for example, returned some of the
colonies after 1815 and also continued to supervise how the Netherlands exer-
cised this colonial authority).23 To a certain extent, the Netherlands became a
“client” of the powerful Albion and had to explicitly adapt important aspects
of its international policy to the demands of this power on the other side of the
North Sea.But like every client, the Netherlands attempted to optimally utilize
the latitude it was given by this complex relationship.
Of a somewhat different order were the economic forces of the world econ-
omy that acted on a small, open economy. These included not only changes in
relative prices—the result of industrialization elsewhere—or the growing
demand for agricultural products in these newly industrialized regions but also
the waves of cyclically increasing and decreasing protectionism. One of the
causes of the relative decline of the Republic after 1670 was the emergence of
mercantilism, especially in the England of Cromwell and the Stuarts and in the
France of Colbert and Louis XIV. This protectionism, in varying disguises,
would thrive until the mid–nineteenth century, only to make way for free trade
after 1846, when the Corn Laws were abolished.Free trade would again come
under pressure due to the agricultural depression after 1873. Here as well, the
question arises of how the institutions called into life by the government—in
the form of import and export duties and other measures focusing on promot-
ing domestic industry—affected economic development in this small, open
economy.
Despite these important exogenous inﬂuences, institutional developments in
the Netherlands during the period 1780–1914 displayed a high degree of “path
dependency,” which brings us to another fundamental aim of the analysis that
follows.24 The generations of politicians who shaped the development of this
state, from the Patriots of the 1780s to the radical liberals of the 1890s,
responded to the speciﬁc economic, political, and institutional problems with
which they were confronted.The solutions they found for their problems often
determined constraints and problems that then confronted the next generation
of politicians. With some exaggeration, one could even state that parts of the
Republic’s economic inheritance, such as its capital wealth, its very productive
agricultural sector, or its rich colonial possessions, would continue to dominate
the evolution of the economy until deep into the twentieth century.Similarly, it10 • Introduction
took three generations of reformers—from the 1780s to the 1840s—to free the
economy of the institutional sclerosis that was the sociopolitical inheritance of
the Republic.The fact that the Dutch economy took its own path between 1780
and 1914 was to a large extent due to this speciﬁc inheritance.In this book, we
will attempt to reconstruct this path in its depth and breadth.
An important aim of this book is to show the extent to which the economic his-
tory of the Netherlands can be rewritten based on the new insights offered by
the new institutional economics. We are convinced that the most important
characteristics of the speciﬁc path taken by the Dutch economy between 1780
and 1914—a path that has been debated by historians for generations—cannot
be understood without these new insights. In addition, we provide a great deal
of new information about the growth of incomes, production, employment,
prices, wages, and other economic indicators. This information is essential to
analyze the long-term development of the economy.We can do this because the
present book is the ﬁnal result of a major study into the national accounts of
the period 1807–1913.This study, in the tradition of scholars such as Gregory
King and Simon Kuznets, has been conducted during the past ten years at the
universities of Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), Utrecht, and Groningen.It has
resulted in a unique and consistent database concerning the national income
and various aspects thereof, and is the quantitative basis for this book.25 In this
regard, we have not aimed at making an exhaustive quantitative analysis of this
database; other publications are being prepared with this aim. An important
objective of our book is to make the information about the economic develop-
ments during the nineteenth century accessible to a relatively broad readership,
since this historical-quantitative research has led to many new insights about
the exact course of economic modernization. During the process of research-
ing and reconstructing the national accounts, however, we gradually realized
that the ultimate determinants of economic development cannot be found in
the growth accounts themselves but must be sought in the complex interaction
between markets and institutions.